RESHAPING FEDERAL JURISDICTION: CONGRESS’S
LATEST CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW
Helen Norton*

The power to confirm or reject federal judicial nominees,
although often the subject of great attention, remains just one of
1
several tools available to Congress for shaping the federal judiciary.
This Article examines growing congressional interest in a distinct
but related legislative check on judicial power: controlling the types
of cases judges may decide by expanding or contracting federal
subject matter jurisdiction.
In recent years, Congress has explored a range of proposals that
variously enlarge and compress federal subject matter jurisdiction,
thus altering federal and state courts’ respective spheres of
influence. In 2004, for example, the House of Representatives twice
voted to strip federal courts of their authority to decide contentious
2
constitutional issues. First, it passed the Marriage Protection Act
to eliminate federal jurisdiction over any question involving the
interpretation or constitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage
3
Act (which provides that no state shall be required to give effect to a
law of any other state with respect to same-sex marriage). Shortly
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1. Other means of judicial control available to Congress include
impeaching judges, changing the judiciary’s size, altering the qualifications for
judicial service, and limiting the remedies that judges may award. C. HERMAN
PRITCHETT, CONGRESS VERSUS THE SUPREME COURT 1957-60, at 26-27 (Da Capo
Press 1973) (1961) (describing legislative tools for controlling the federal
judiciary); TASK FORCE ON THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN SETTING THE POWER
AND JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS, CITIZENS FOR INDEP. COURTS, BALANCING ACT:
LEGISLATIVE POWER AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (2000), reprinted in UNCERTAIN
JUSTICE: POLITICS IN AMERICA’S COURTS 205 (2000) [hereinafter BALANCING ACT].
2. H.R. 3313, 108th Cong., 150 CONG. REC. H6613 (daily ed. July 22,
2004).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
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thereafter, the House passed the Pledge Protection Act, which
would do away with federal courts’ power to hear any First
5
Amendment challenge to the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.
Although the Senate voted on neither of these bills, the House’s
passage of both in the same session of Congress—as well as its
subsequent re-passage of the Pledge Protection Act in the next
6
Congress —signals unprecedented congressional support for
abolishing federal courts’ jurisdiction over certain constitutional
controversies.
In 2005, Congress undertook an unusual expansion of federal
judicial authority when it empowered federal courts to hear specific
federal constitutional and statutory challenges to the order to
withdraw life-sustaining measures from Terri Schiavo. Applying
only to claims brought by Ms. Schiavo’s parents (the Schindlers), the
Schiavo Act expressly directed the federal courts to consider those
claims de novo, regardless of the exhaustion of state remedies and
notwithstanding the Florida state courts’ prior determinations
7
upholding the decision to discontinue Ms. Schiavo’s food and water.
The Act thus eliminated procedural barriers that otherwise would
8
have thwarted federal review of the Schindlers’ claims.
At about the same time, Congress’s enactment of the Class
9
Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”) dramatically increased federal courts’
jurisdiction over class actions brought under state law. CAFA
requires only minimal diversity to trigger federal jurisdiction in

4. H.R. 2028, 108th Cong., 150 CONG. REC. H7478 (daily ed. Sept. 23,
2004).
5. Id.
6. 152 CONG. REC. H5433 (daily ed. July 19, 2006).
7. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L.
No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005) (“[T]he District Court shall determine de novo
any claim of a violation of any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo within the scope
of this Act, notwithstanding any prior State court determination and regardless
of whether such a claim has previously been raised, considered, or decided in
State court proceedings. The District Court shall entertain and determine the
suit without any delay or abstention in favor of State court proceedings, and
regardless of whether remedies available to the State courts have been
exhausted.”).
8. Michael P. Allen, Congress and Terri Schiavo: A Primer on the
American Constitutional Order?, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 309, 313 (2005); see also
Schiavo v. Greer, No. 8:05-CV-522-T-30TGW, 2005 WL 754121, at *1 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 18, 2005) (in a decision prior to the Schiavo Act, applying the RookerFeldman doctrine—which bars federal district courts from reviewing claims
already adjudicated in state court—to hold that that federal courts have no
jurisdiction over the Schindlers’ claims).
9. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C. (2000)).
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covered cases, rather than the complete diversity that had
11
previously been required. Moreover, CAFA dismantled a series of
barriers to the removal of such claims to federal court when initially
12
filed in state court. As a result, CAFA enables federal courts to
adjudicate a wide range of class actions alleging violations of state
product liability, consumer fraud, environmental protection, civil
13
rights, and other laws.
While the Marriage Protection and Pledge Protection Acts
signal the House of Representatives’ suspicion of federal judges’
interpretation of federal constitutional law in certain high-profile
areas, the Schiavo and Class Action Fairness Acts highlight
Congress’s disaffection with state courts’ application of state law in
other matters. Congressional champions of these jurisdictional
changes treated them as completely independent efforts, offering no
analysis of their collective implications for the allocation of judicial
authority. Indeed, their critics charged that these various measures
share no common thread other than proponents’ exercise of sheer
14
political power.
10. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(d)(2) (West 2006). “Minimal diversity” describes the
situation where any member of the plaintiff class and any defendant are
citizens of different states. Note that CAFA does not apply to the following
state law class actions: those involving classes of less than one hundred
plaintiffs; those where two-thirds of the class and at least one primary
defendant reside in the same state; those where the primary defendants are
states or state officials; those involving shareholder or derivative suits; and
those where the aggregate amount in controversy does not exceed $5,000,000.
Id. at § 1332(d)(2), (4)-(6), (9).
11. “Complete diversity” describes the situation where all named class
representatives are citizens of states different from all defendants. Prior to
CAFA’s enactment, most state class actions were governed by 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a), which empowers federal courts to hear state law claims only when the
parties are completely diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
12. After CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b)-(c)(1) makes clear that the following
barriers to defendants’ ability to remove to federal court diversity cases filed
originally in state court no longer apply to covered class actions: 28 U.S.C. §
1441(b) (preventing removal of diversity claim when any defendant is a citizen
of the state in which the case is pending); 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (barring removal
one year after commencement of the state court action); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
(barring appellate review of a federal district court’s decision to remand a case
to state court).
13. Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1606, 1615 (2006) (“CAFA is primarily a
jurisdictional act, accomplishing the transfer to federal courts of most
multistate class actions.”).
14. See, e.g., Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction to Protect Marriage for the
States: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 137 (2004) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Rep.
John Conyers, Jr., Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“My careful analysis of
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But taken together, these proposals illuminate legislators’
emerging views on the appropriate distribution of power between
state and federal courts, and on judicial review altogether. In
particular, they signal Congress’s increasingly common assessment
that the courts—both federal and state—are appropriate arbiters of
particular disputes only to the extent that their decisions reflect the
preferences of a majority of congressional representatives. Indeed,
at least in some contexts, legislative efforts to reshape the balance of
power between state and federal courts may serve a strain of
popular constitutionalism—which characterizes “the people,” rather
than the courts, as the Constitution’s only legitimate interpreters—
by expressing “the people’s” constitutional preferences through the
jurisdictional choices made by their elected representatives. On the
other hand, this technique exposes difficulties in the actual practice,
if not the theory, of popular constitutionalism and its consequences
for the administration of justice.
These initiatives expose Congress’s mounting yet intermittent
willingness to invoke popular constitutionalism to permit the
legislature to redistribute jurisdiction to curb a federal or state
judiciary that has produced decisions inconsistent with the
preferences of a congressional majority. While these efforts help
clarify the theory’s costs and benefits for contemporary America,
opportunistic congressional appeals to popular constitutionalism
invite skepticism about the prospects for its principled application.
Part I of this Article offers some background on the history and
constitutionality of congressional efforts to reallocate judicial power
between federal and state judiciaries. Part II then outlines recently
revived academic interest in popular constitutionalism as a
challenge to judicial review.
After this foundation, Part III discusses the House debate and
passage of the Marriage Protection and Pledge Protection Acts,
focusing on lawmakers’ rationales for withdrawing federal
jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the Defense of
Marriage Act and the Pledge of Allegiance. It suggests that these
proposals offer a contemporary case study of popular
constitutionalism
as
an
antidote
to
judicial
review’s
countermajoritarian implications. Part III further finds that these
efforts answer at least some of popular constitutionalism’s critics by
supplementing what has been largely a descriptive account of the
theory’s past practice with a concrete modern-day application.
this matter shows that Republicans favor federal court jurisdiction when state
courts and juries issue rulings that conservatives do not like. These areas
generally include crime, torts, and presidential elections in which the
Democratic candidate has won.”).
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Moreover, by retaining a role for at least some court system in
achieving finality and settlement when resolving important
disputes, these initiatives may offer an especially attractive option
for those suspicious of judges, yet reluctant to abandon judicial
review altogether. On the other hand, these efforts expose the
weaknesses of popular constitutionalism put into practice, such as
the difficulty ascertaining with confidence “the people’s”
constitutional preferences, the danger that Congress may be seeking
to transfer power from the courts not to the people, but to itself, and
the potential that “the people’s” Constitution will be interpreted to
mean very different things in different parts of the country.
Part IV then compares the debates surrounding legislation that
facilitated Congress’s preference for a federal, rather than state,
forum for certain matters. It first examines the Schiavo Act’s shift
of a high-profile family dispute from state to federal court, and then
examines extension of this technique to non-constitutional cases,
like the multistate class actions addressed by CAFA. This Part
observes popular constitutionalism’s limited ability to explain
congressional support for either proposal, noting that advocates of
jurisdictional change rely only sporadically on certain values – such
as federal courts’ judicial independence and greater ability to ensure
uniform interpretations—when debating the division of power
between state and federal courts. It concludes that Congress’s
growing interest in jurisdictional realignment may be fueled more
by a simple interest in changing the identity of litigation’s winners
and losers than by a thoughtful reevaluation of the courts’
appropriate spheres of influence.
I.

CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO SHAPE JUDICIAL POWER

Congress has long sought to check the federal judiciary by
15
threatening to strip it of the authority to hear certain cases. As far

15. Although Congress may shape courts’ jurisdiction in a number of ways,
I focus here on its decisions to shift the power to hear certain disputes from the
federal to state courts or vice versa. Note, of course, that Congress can act to
constrain federal jurisdiction apart from leaving certain federal questions
entirely to state courts. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2765
(2006) (finding no need to address whether the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
unconstitutionally impinged on the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction or
unconstitutionally superseded the writ of habeas corpus when it vested the
District of Columbia Circuit with exclusive jurisdiction over certain claims). In
this Part, I use the term “court-stripping” or “jurisdiction-stripping” to refer to
congressional efforts to eliminate federal jurisdiction over certain federal
constitutional claims. Note, however, that commentators sometimes use these
terms more broadly to include legislation that constrains federal courts in any
way. John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court
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back as the 1820s, for example, members of Congress tried to
abolish the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review state court
16
judgments addressing the constitutionality of state laws. And in
the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress attempted to thwart the
17
Court’s ability to review certain Reconstruction-era actions by,
among other efforts, repealing a statute that had authorized the
18
Court to hear appeals from unsuccessful habeas corpus petitioners.
Congressional interest in shifting decisionmaking over certain
constitutional claims from federal to state courts deepened in the
latter half of the twentieth century. Segregationists, enraged by the

Stripping, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 429 (2001) (describing legislation that limits
federal judges’ ability to assess certain non-constitutional claims as “courtstripping”); David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due
Process as Limits on Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J.
2481, 2482 (1998) (same); Leti Volpp, Court-Stripping and Class-Wide Relief: A
Response to Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 463, 466 (2000) (same).
16. See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 152 (2004) (describing a range of
unsuccessful congressional court-stripping efforts between 1810 and 1835);
Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 896-97 (1984)
(describing early nineteenth century efforts to repeal section 25 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized the Supreme Court to review certain
state court judgments). For further discussion of Congress’s long history of
attempted court-stripping, see Maurice S. Culp, A Survey of the Proposals to
Limit or Deny the Power of Judicial Review by the Supreme Court of the United
States, 4 IND. L.J. 386 (1929); Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in
American History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925 (1965).
17. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Same-Sex Marriage, the Constitution, and
Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: Be Careful What You Wish
For, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 363, 364 (2005) (“For example, in the midst of the
chaotic post-Civil War period, on a number of occasions the Radical Republican
Congress sought—with varying degrees of success—to insulate significant
portions of its oppressive program of Reconstruction from Supreme Court
review.”).
18. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). In McCardle, the
Court upheld Congress’s jurisdictional repeal. Id. at 514. This decision is
sometimes characterized as affirming Congress’s constitutional power to divest
the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction over certain controversial matters
under Article III’s Exceptions Clause. On the other hand, the Court specifically
noted that it still retained jurisdiction over habeas cases pursuant to another
statute, and later observed potential constitutional problems if Congress were
entirely to deprive the Court of jurisdiction in habeas cases. Ex parte Yerger,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 105 (1869). Although the breadth of that Reconstructionera limitation thus remains unclear, it nevertheless illustrates Congress’s
longstanding interest in curtailing federal judicial review of contentious
constitutional disputes.
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Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, sought,
but failed, to strip the federal courts of the authority to handle
20
school desegregation matters. Later allying themselves with those
infuriated by the Court’s decisions striking down various
21
government actions designed to control “subversive” activities,
those segregationists then tried to eliminate federal jurisdiction over
22
a range of national security issues, again without success. Just a
few years later, in response to the Court’s 1964 decision in Reynolds
23
v. Sims, the House passed a proposal to remove federal jurisdiction
over legal efforts to reapportion state legislatures, only to see the
24
bill die in the Senate.
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a rash of bills seeking
to move a host of hot-button constitutional issues—including school
busing, abortion, and women’s participation in the military—from
25
federal to state courts. Only one—a proposal to strip the federal
courts of jurisdiction over cases relating to voluntary prayer in
public schools—gained any real traction, passing in the Senate, but
19. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that segregated public schools violate
the Equal Protection Clause).
20. See, e.g., H.R. 1228, 85th Cong. (1957); J. Patrick White, The Warren
Court Under Attack: The Role of the Judiciary in a Democratic Society, 29 MD.
L. REV. 181, 187-88 (1959) (describing southern efforts to “humble the Supreme
Court” by introducing proposals that would have stripped the federal courts of
jurisdiction over integration, only to have those proposals “referred to
Congressional committees and promptly forgotten except by their sponsors”).
21. See PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at vii, 31 (describing the Senate’s proposal
to withdraw five areas of controversy from the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction—
hereinafter referred to as the “Jenner-Butler” bill—as motivated by opposition
to Brown as well as to the Court’s national security decisions); see also White,
supra note 20, at 189 (“Southern Congressmen, having failed in their initial
effort to mobilize anti-court sentiment with desegregation as the issue, were
quick to perceive that their purpose of discrediting the Court would be served
whether the issue was undue concern for civil liberties or softness to
communism or states’ rights. They simply shifted their ground and joined with
fresh vigor in the new attack on the Court.”).
22. See PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at 37-40 (describing how these bills were
reported to the full Senate, vigorously debated, and subjected to procedural
maneuvering, but ultimately never brought to a final vote); Max Baucus &
Kenneth R. Kay, The Court Stripping Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution,
the Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REV. 988, 991 (1982) (same).
23. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring state legislatures to comply with “one
person, one vote” reapportionment).
24. See Irving Brant, Appellate Jurisdiction: Congressional Assertion of the
Exceptions Clause, 53 OR. L. REV. 3, 26 (1973) (describing House passage of the
“Tuck bill,” only to have the Senate allow it to die without action).
25. Baucus & Kay, supra note 22, at 992 & n.18 (noting that more than
thirty bills had been introduced in the 97th Congress to remove federal
jurisdiction “in one realm or another”).
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26

dying in the House without a vote. In sum, although congressional
efforts to shift certain controversial constitutional issues exclusively
to state courts date back hundreds of years and gathered increased
27
momentum late in the twentieth century, very rarely has any
court-stripping bill been passed by either House, and none has ever
28
been enacted into law.
These measures’ constitutionality remains a matter of vigorous
debate. Article III’s exceptions clause describes Congress’s power to
limit the Supreme Court’s appellate authority:
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall
29
make.

Section 1 of Article III addresses the lower federal courts,
providing that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
30
Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.”
The
framers’ use of the term “may” to describe Congress’s discretion to
26. Id. at 991. After Senate passage, the House held a series of hearings on
the matter, but never brought it to a vote. See generally Prayer in Public
Schools and Buildings—Federal Court Jurisdiction: Hearings on S. 450 Before
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Admin. of Justice, 96th Cong. (1980).
27. See William G. Ross, The Resilience of Marbury v. Madison: Why
Judicial Review Has Survived So Many Attacks, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733,
743 (2003) (“Since 1937, limitation of jurisdiction over specific issues has been
the most favored method of court-curbing among critics of the Court.”).
28. ELIZABETH B. BAZAN ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORITY OVER THE FEDERAL COURTS 14, 18 (2005) (“There are few examples of
Congress attempting to use its power over federal court jurisdiction to limit
judicial review of substantive constitutional law, and no examples of Congress
successfully precluding federal courts from an entire area of constitutional
concern. . . . Elimination by Congress of all federal question review over a
particular constitutional question by the Supreme Court appears to be
unprecedented.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to CourtStripping, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 347, 359 (2005) (“[T]he authors of a leading
casebook on federal jurisdiction have observed, ‘[a]t least since the 1930s, no bill
that has been interpreted to withdraw all federal court jurisdiction with respect
to a particular substantive area has become law.’”) (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON,
JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
322 (5th ed. 2003)).
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added).
30. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added).
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establish lower federal courts has been widely understood to include
the lesser power to divest those courts of some or all of the
31
jurisdiction authorized by Article III.
A number of scholars argue that Congress’s Article III power to
curtail federal jurisdiction is thus extremely broad, limited only by
32
separation of powers, due process, and equal protection principles.
Others contend that additional constraints further restrict
congressional control over federal courts’ jurisdiction.
Some
maintain, for example, that Congress may not target certain
constitutional rights for encumberance by foreclosing their
33
adjudication in federal court, while others contend that Congress
may not exclude constitutional claims from both the lower courts
34
and the Supreme Court’s appellate review.
Commentators thus

31. See, e.g., Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 329-31 (1938)
(suggesting that Congress may deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over
constitutional claims). But see Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 366-67
(1974) (suggesting that depriving the lower federal courts of jurisdiction to
review constitutional challenges to veterans’ benefits legislation would “raise
serious questions”); Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 155-56
(1872) (striking down statute eliminating lower federal court jurisdiction over
claims of pardoned Confederate sympathizers).
32. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1031-33 (1982) (concluding that
Article III confers Congress with plenary power to constrain federal courts’
jurisdiction); Redish, supra note 17, at 363-65 (concluding that Congress may
not constitutionally use its exceptions power to violate separation of powers
limits by resolving substantive constitutional questions, nor may it violate
equal protection by directly discriminating against minorities in accessing
federal courts, nor may it violate due process by cutting off all access to
independent judicial forums for adjudicating constitutional rights).
33. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, Congressional Obligation
to Provide a Forum for Constitutional Claims: Discriminatory Jurisdictional
Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69 VA. L. REV. 819, 822 (1983) (arguing that
Congress “cannot discriminate against constitutional claims in drafting
jurisdictional bills”); Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zoning
Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 129
(1981) (same); see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362,
1365 (1953) (maintaining that congressional court-stripping is unconstitutional
when it “destroy[s] the essential role of the Supreme Court in the constitutional
system”).
34. Akhil R. Amar, A Non-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 238-59 (1985); see also
Leonard Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 166-67 (1960) (maintaining that the
Constitution requires that the Supreme Court have authority to review lower
and state court judgments on constitutional matters to ensure the uniformity
and supremacy of the U.S. Constitution and federal law).
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sharply differ as to the constitutionality of these particular court35
stripping bills.
The Supreme Court has yet to provide any
definitive guidance on this controversy, largely because Congress
has never enacted the sort of court-stripping legislation that would
36
trigger such a constitutional confrontation.
Congress can shape federal subject matter jurisdiction not only
by restricting federal courts’ authority, but also by increasing it.
Article III defines the outer limits of federal judicial authority, with
Congress constitutionally free to confer all, part, or none of that
37
authority to the federal courts. One especially prominent exercise
of this expansive authority took place in 1875, when Congress
conferred the federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction over all
38
types of federal questions.
Another occurred in 1980, when
Congress enabled federal courts to entertain federal questions

35. Compare, e.g., Gerhardt, supra note 28, at 348-49 (concluding that the
Marriage Protection Act violates separation of powers, due process, and equal
protection principles) with Redish, supra note 17, at 379-80 (concluding that the
Marriage Protection Act is constitutional but unwise). See also Gunther, supra
note 16, at 921 (finding relatively broad constitutional authorization for
congressional court-stripping, but concluding that such bills are unwise even if
constitutional).
36. See, e.g., Prayer in Public Schools and Buildings—Federal Court
Jurisdiction: Hearings on S. 450 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice, 96th Cong. 364
(1980) (statement of Professor Lawrence Sager) (“[P]rudence, restraint, and
mutual respect have been characteristic of the relationships between the
legislative and judicial branches of the federal government.
For the
legislature’s part, this has meant respect for the independence of the federal
courts, bought at the price of resisting what at times have been powerful
temptations to invade that independence.”); Proceedings of the Forty-Third
Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 96 F.R.D. 245,
276 (1982) (remarks of Professor William Van Alstyne) (noting that Congress
has historically “forborne” from enacting such statutes to avoid triggering a
constitutional confrontation).
37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. This power extends
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; to all Cases affecting Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls; to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States;
between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of
different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
38. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.
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39

The Schiavo Act and
regardless of the amount in controversy.
CAFA provide especially recent illustrations of congressional
enlargement of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
These expansive efforts generate constitutional controversy, too.
The Schiavo Act’s conferral of jurisdiction to federal courts to decide
specific claims without regard to prior state court determinations,
for example, triggered charges that it violated constitutional
separation of powers, equal protection, and bill of attainder
40
provisions. That Act’s validity remains unresolved as the federal
courts assumed, without deciding, its constitutionality when ruling
41
against the Schindlers on the merits.
And although CAFA’s
constitutionality received considerably less attention, some critics
suggested that CAFA substitutes federal for state law preferences in
42
violation of the federalism principles embodied in the Constitution.
Although the validity of these various jurisdiction-shaping
43
efforts remains unclear, my analysis for the purposes of this Article
39. Federal Questions Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-486, § 2, 94 Stat. 2369 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)).
40. See, e.g., BAZAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 29 (“An argument could be
made that congressional legislation that applies to a specific court case may be
construed as imposing additional burdens on the litigants involved,” thus
raising equal protection, due process, and bill of attainder concerns); Ross K.
Baker, Congress’s Actions Not Sustained by Constitution, NEWSDAY, Mar. 22,
2005, at A35 (suggesting that the Schiavo Act was unconstitutional on privacy
and bill of attainder grounds); Bruce Fein, Ploy Chorus . . . Law Libretto, WASH.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 2005, at A14 (arguing that the Schiavo Act “flagrantly
trespassed on the judicial domain and usurped state powers. . . . Congress was
unable to summon a single syllable in the constitution to authorize its action.
Further, the Founding Fathers would have been outraged by the statute’s
violence to the separation of powers”). But see Allen, supra note 8, at 316
(concluding that the Schiavo Act is constitutional, albeit unwise).
41. Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1382-83
(M.D. Fla. 2005) (noting that “there may be substantial issues concerning the
constitutionality of the Act,” but presuming the Act’s constitutionality for
purposes of ruling on the motion for a temporary restraining order), aff’d 403
F.3d 1223, 1226-28 (11th Cir. 2005) (upholding the district court’s denial of the
motion, and thus finding no need to decide the legislation’s constitutionality),
petition for expedited reh’g en banc denied, 404 F.3d 1270, 1271-72 (11th Cir.
2005) (Birch, J., concurring) (noting that he would have found that the Act was
unconstitutional as violating separation of powers principles).
42. See, e.g., GEORGENE M. VAIRO, CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005, at
13 (2005) (“Now, however, with the renewed emphasis on state sovereignty, the
dignity of the states, and their role as co-partners in governing the people, it is
not frivolous to argue that legislation based on the findings articulated in CAFA
is constitutionally flawed. Indeed, a target of CAFA is the state as personified
by its judiciary.”) (footnote omitted).
43. See, e.g., BAZAN ET AL., supra note 28, at 21-22 (“In sum, there is no
direct court precedent on the issue of whether Congress can eliminate all
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assumes that these measures would pass constitutional muster. I
focus instead on the light these proposals shed on changing
congressional views on the proper allocation of federal and state
judicial power, and their implications for judicial review.
II.

POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS CHALLENGE
TO JUDICIAL POWER

Some background on popular constitutionalism as a critique of
judicial review may help illuminate Congress’s renewed interest
(and increased success) in shaping federal jurisdiction as a
technique for curbing the judiciary’s power. To be sure, judicial
review—the notion that the judiciary has final and binding
authority to interpret the Constitution—has faced attack without
cease since its embrace by the Supreme Court in Marbury v.
44
Madison.
While supporters of judicial review emphasize federal
judges’ life tenure (and thus their independence) as an irreplaceable
45
safeguard of individual rights from the tyranny of the majority, its
46
critics have long targeted its countermajoritarian implications,
characterizing “judicial supremacy over constitutional meaning as
47
threatening the very essence of democracy itself—popular rule.”
Attacks on judicial review have sprung sometimes from the left and
sometimes from the right, depending on the Court’s decisional
48
trends.
Most recently, a number of progressive scholars have joined the

federal court jurisdiction over a constitutional issue, and little or no consensus
among scholars.”); Gordon G. Young, A Critical Reassessment of the Case Law
Bearing on Congress’s Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal
Courts, 54 MD. L. REV. 132, 139 (1995) (describing the lack of clarity in the
Court’s case law on this topic).
44. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
45. Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257,
309 (2005) (“Particularly prominent during the last century has been the belief
that judges enforcing the Constitution will protect minority rights and enforce
constitutional safeguards.”); Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1105, 1130-31 (1977) (concluding that federal courts are better qualified to
adjudicate constitutional and civil rights claims).
46. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23
(Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4-9 (1980).
47. Friedman, supra note 45, at 309, 321 (2005) (describing critical views of
judicial review).
48. See Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of
Popular Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673, 673-74 (describing
progressive criticism of judicial review in the Lochner era, followed by
conservative challenges to judicial review as practiced by the Warren Court).
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49

According to these advocates, judicial review’s
critics’ ranks.
insulation from democratic processes invites “judicial overreaching
and citizen passivity, which together threaten important features of
50
our constitutional culture.” They decry the ascendancy of judicial
review as enervating the public’s political engagement, and contrast
this contemporary trend with Americans’ historic commitment to
enforcing the Constitution themselves. As examples, they offer past
instances of jury nullification, civil disobedience, and mob rule
resisting various government actors’ unacceptable constitutional
51
interpretations;
departmentalism, whereby each branch of
government assumed responsibility for interpreting the Constitution
52
itself rather than deferring to the Court; the growth of political
53
parties organized around competing constitutional understandings;
54
and social protest movements.
Not only do judicial review’s contemporary critics assail its
antidemocratic implications and its inconsistency with their
understanding of longstanding American practice, they also attack
the fundamental premise that an independent judiciary better
55
protects rights than democratically elected bodies.
They charge
that federal courts have instead too often remained indifferent, if
not hostile, to the defense of constitutional rights and liberties:
A judicial monopoly on constitutional interpretation is now
depicted as inexorable and inevitable, as something that was
meant to be and that saved us from ourselves. The historical
voice of judicial authority is privileged while opposition to the
Court’s self-aggrandizing tendencies is ignored, muted, or
discredited.
....
We see it in chronicles that portray the Court as a major
force advancing American liberty—as if most gains were not in
fact made in spite of rather than because of the Justices.
Marbury and Brown loom large in these histories. The
49. Id. at 675 (“In the last several years, the trendiest development in
constitutional scholarship has prominent progressive scholars arguing against
judicial review.”).
50. Robert
Post
&
Reva
Siegel,
Popular
Constitutionalism,
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2004).
51. KRAMER, supra note 16, at 3-5.
52. Id. at 209-13.
53. Id. at 189-203.
54. Id. at 221.
55. See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115
YALE L.J. 1346, 1406 (2006).
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judicially inspired prosecutions for sedition, Dred Scott, the
dismantling of Reconstruction, the fifty years of opposition to
social welfare legislation, Korematsu, complicity in the Red
scares, and the current hobbling of federal power to remedy
56
discrimination all somehow shrink into insignificance.

These contemporary skeptics thus urge a return to “popular
constitutionalism,” whereby “[f]inal interpretive authority rest[s]
57
with ‘the people themselves.’”
Popular constitutionalism, in the
words of Mark Tushnet, instead relies “on the idea that we all ought
to participate in creating constitutional law through our actions in
58
politics.”
Kramer, Tushnet, Jeremy Waldron, and others often
characterize the choice between judicial review and popular
constitutionalism as one between aristocracy and democracy.
Kramer, for example, views judicial review’s defenders as “today’s
aristocrats”: “[T]hey approach the problem of democratic governance
from a position of deep ambivalence: committed to the idea of
popular rule, yet pessimistic and fearful about what it might
produce and so anxious to hedge their bets by building in extra
59
safeguards.” In contrast, popular constitutionalists “have greater
faith in the capability of their fellow citizens to govern responsibly.
They see risks, but are not persuaded that the risks justify
60
circumscribing popular control by overtly undemocratic means.”
Popular constitutionalism’s advocates thus mourn what they
see as the “all-but-complete disappearance of public challenges to
61
the Justices’ supremacy over constitutional law.” Many close their
analyses with a challenge to the American public, as exemplified by
Tushnet: “As Lincoln said, the Constitution belongs to the people.
62
Perhaps it is time for us to reclaim it from the courts.” Kramer

56. KRAMER, supra note 16, at 229; see also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 172 (1999) (arguing that judicial review
now largely thwarts progressive causes). But see William E. Forbath, Popular
Constitutionalism in the Twentieth Century, 81 CHI-KENT L. REV. 101, 105-08
(2006) (noting popular constitutionalism’s “dark side” in advocating states’
rights to thwart legislative and judicial efforts to address race discrimination).
57. KRAMER, supra note 16, at 8.
Some have chided popular
constitutionalism’s advocates for failing to define the term with specificity. See,
e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 675-76 (“Although the phrase ‘popular
constitutionalism’ increasingly appears in constitutional scholarship, there is no
precise definition of the concept. . . . A major frustration in discussing the body
of scholarship arguing for popular constitutionalism is its failure to define the
concept with any precision.”) (footnote omitted).
58. TUSHNET, supra note 56, at 157.
59. KRAMER, supra note 16, at 247.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 228.
62. TUSHNET, supra note 56, at 194.
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similarly urges Americans to rescue their Constitution: “That means
publicly repudiating Justices who say that they, not we, possess
ultimate authority to say what the Constitution means. It means
publicly reprimanding politicians who insist that ‘as Americans’ we
63
should submissively yield to whatever the Supreme Court decides.”
Advocates of popular constitutionalism paint an attractive
picture of the theory’s objectives of enhancing democratic legitimacy
64
and our collective “capacity for ongoing self-definition.” But how,
precisely, would this work in practice? Through what institutional
mechanism should “the people” interpret and enforce the
Constitution? These are not easy questions. And, as a number of
critics have noted, popular constitutionalists offer little in the way of
65
specific answers. As David Franklin points out, earlier expressions
of popular constitutionalism—like mobbing and jury nullification—

63. KRAMER, supra note 16, at 247-48.
64. Domi Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia,
and the True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 908 (2005).
65. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular?
Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594, 1617-18, 1635-36 (2005) (criticizing
Kramer’s articulation of popular constitutionalism as failing to identify exactly
how “the people” should act in practice to assert their power to interpret the
Constitution); Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 678 (“[O]ne can criticize popular
constitutionalists for their ambiguity and for failing to spell out their visions of
the judicial role . . . .”); David L. Franklin, Popular Constitutionalism as
Presidential Constitutionalism?, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1069, 1069 (2006)
(“[T]hose who march under the loose banner of popular constitutionalism have
said very little about the particular institutional mechanisms that would make
their vision a reality in today’s world.”); Gewirtzman, supra note 64, at 910
(“[P]opular constitutionalists are—almost to a person—completely silent about
what their theories demand from individual citizens in order to operate
effectively.”). Some commentators suggest that popular constitutionalists may
want nothing more than greater political involvement, and are simply
challenging us to find a contemporary way to do so. See, e.g., Franklin, supra,
at 1071 (suggesting that Kramer’s popular constitutionalism may “entail[]
primarily a change in attitude. . . . On this model, popular constitutionalism is
not a specific program or institutional arrangement. It is, rather, a tonic: a
much-needed reminder for people to quit acting as if the Court had a monopoly
on constitutional meaning.”); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Bringing the People Back
In, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 653, 658 (2005) (“The reliance on courts to improve society
. . . has enervated politics. . . . As the legalist approach to the Constitution has
gained prominence, American political culture has atrophied.”); Post & Siegel,
supra note 50, at 1043 (“We may thus interpret Kramer’s call for popular
constitutionalism as sounding in the register of political virtue, rather than of
legal rights. Kramer’s fundamental indictment is that as federal courts have
expanded and bureaucratized, and as the articulation of constitutional law has
become pervasive and routinized, the participation of the American people in
the formation of the Constitution has become correspondingly enervated and
attenuated.”).
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“no longer have the central role they once had. . . . [T]he role once
played directly by the people is now played by elected
representatives, national political parties, interest groups, and the
66
media. In short, the people ain’t what they used to be.” More
specifically, Franklin wonders, “Whom do we trust to speak for the
67
people in constitutional matters?”
A growing number in Congress appear increasingly poised to
accept popular constitutionalism’s challenge to Americans that they
68
reclaim the Constitution from the courts. These legislators propose
a specific technique for achieving the movement’s goals today:
shifting jurisdiction to the judiciary, state or federal, more likely to
replicate the constitutional preferences of a congressional majority
as a proxy for “the people’s” own preferences. This Article next
examines proposals to shift jurisdiction from one judiciary to
another as a contemporary case study of popular constitutionalism.
III. RECENT CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES TO SHIFT POWER FROM
FEDERAL TO STATE COURTS
This Part first describes the House of Representatives’ reliance
on popular constitutionalism to support passage of the Marriage
Protection and Pledge Protection Acts, and then considers the
theory’s strengths and weaknesses as exposed by this particular
application.
A. The House of Representatives’ Reliance on Popular
Constitutionalism to Support Shifting Jurisdiction Over Certain
Constitutional Claims from Federal to State Courts
Congressional court-stripping proponents are animated by what
they see as federal courts’ disregard for “the people’s” understanding
of
fundamental
constitutional
and/or
moral
principles.
Representative Spencer Bacchus summarized these concerns when
explaining his support for the Marriage Protection Act:

66. Franklin, supra note 65, at 1075; see also Gewirtzman, supra note 64,
at 900 (“The problem begins with ‘the People,’ a term popular constitutionalists
invoke with some regularity but are reluctant to define. . . . At different times,
‘the People’ inhabit the shoes of, among other entities, the electorate, prominent
interest groups, identity-based social movements, the United States Congress,
the President, political parties, state government institutions, or impactlitigation plaintiffs.”) (footnotes omitted).
67. Franklin, supra note 65, at 1076.
68. See Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 689 (“Popular constitutionalism is
an attractive theory for progressives because it emphasizes populism and trust
in the people, while turning against the courts at a time when the federal
judiciary is increasingly dominated by conservative Republicans. Ironically, it
has the left and the right coming together in their criticism of the courts.”).
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The circumstances that we find ourselves in are occasioned by
an increasingly intrusive and tyrannical judiciary, who
through recent court decisions are redefining for all Americans
the institution of marriage. These decisions demonstrate a
judiciary out of touch with the intent of the Framers as well as
69
the moral norms of society.

Representative Hostettler similarly outlined his understanding
of Congress’s role in protecting the Constitution from an
independent federal judiciary when explaining his sponsorship of
the Pledge Protection Act:
[T]he notion of an independent judiciary fails the Constitution
test. The simple fact is, the framers of the Constitution did
not want an unelected, unaccountable, life-tenured body,
namely, the judiciary, to be able to, by writ large, enact policy
across the country when the people themselves would not have
an obligation or an ability to reverse it. But they gave that
authority in the Constitution to “the people’s” representatives
70
in the Congress.

Members of Congress who believe that federal courts are
frustrating “the people’s” constitutional preferences then face the
question of what to do about it. Popular constitutionalist responses
might include amending Article III to abolish federal judges’ life
tenure or even eliminating federal courts entirely. Indeed, during
hearings on the Marriage Protection Act in the 108th Congress,
Representative Hostettler suggested the possibility of eradicating
the federal judicial branch altogether:
Today we will hear a wide range of means by which we can
deal with the situation of a judiciary that has time and time
again worked outside of its boundaries, and that response can
be everything from doing nothing to an amendment to the
Constitution. And that amendment to the Constitution can be,
in the most extreme case, repeal of article [sic] III of the
71
Constitution itself.

69. Hearings, supra note 14, at 136.
70. 150 CONG. REC. H7473 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004); see also Hon. John
Hostettler, Remarks to the Conservative Political Action Conference (Jan.
22, 2004), http://www.house.gov/hostettler/Issues/Hostettler-issues-2004-01-22CPAC-Remarks.htm (“Not only did the Framers of the Constitution not appoint
Judges God, they barely made the Judiciary relevant.”).
71. Hearings, supra note 14, at 6; see also id. at 136 (“Whenever
jurisdiction limitation is discussed, the argument that the judiciary is the final
arbiter of the Constitution is sure to arise. It is time for this Congress to ask
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But although a few in Congress challenged the federal
judiciary’s existence altogether, more chose to enforce their
understanding of “the people’s” constitutional preferences, not by
amending the Constitution, but by transferring decisionmaking
72
power over certain matters to more majoritarian state courts. To
this end, legislators proposed—and the House agreed—to eliminate
federal court jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the
73
Defense of Marriage Act and the Pledge of Allegiance.
In the 2006 floor debate on the Pledge Protection Act,
Representative Akin made clear the House’s goal to protect “the
people’s” Constitution from the federal courts:
Essentially, what our bill does, if you want to put it in a simple
word picture, we are creating a fence. The fence goes around
the Federal judiciary. We do that because we don’t trust them.
We don’t trust them because of previous decisions and because
of the simple fact that there are not five votes on the Supreme
Court to protect our beloved Pledge of Allegiance. And 80
percent to 90 percent of Americans would like to leave the
74
Pledge of Allegiance the way it is.

Indeed, Representative King characterized court-stripping as a
relatively mild rejoinder to federal courts’ perceived abuses:
We could do far more. In fact, I voted to split the ninth circuit
[sic] in half. I would vote to abolish them if they continue this
kind of behavior, throwing this into the face of the American
people. We are not doing that. We are very carefully, very
narrowly addressing something that the American people are
75
asking for . . . .

A House majority pounced on renewed attention to popular
constitutionalism to support selective shifts of jurisdiction from a
federal judiciary perceived insistent on usurping “the people’s”
power to interpret the Constitution to more politically accountable
state courts.
Indeed, the September 2004 House Judiciary
who gave the courts this right. The answer is the Supreme Court itself, in
Marbury v. Madison. Over the last 200 years, however, the judiciary has
continued to seize legislative powers, and the legislature has done little to stop
that confiscation.”).
72. Amending the Constitution is a hugely daunting task. See U.S. CONST.
art. V (providing that any constitutional amendment requires first a two-thirds
vote of both Houses of Congress or application by two-thirds of state
legislatures, followed by ratification by three-fourths of the states).
73. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
74. 152 CONG. REC. H5415 (daily ed. July 19, 2006).
75. Id.
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Committee Report for the Pledge Protection Act (which, for the most
part, simply tracks that of the Marriage Protection Act produced a
few months earlier) included a new section that relied heavily on
Kramer’s recently published book on popular constitutionalism.
This new section, entitled “The Founders Considered the People to
Be the Ultimate Interpreters of the Constitution,” included the
following extensive (but heavily excised) quotation from Kramer’s
work as legitimizing the Committee majority’s intuitions about
federal judicial power as a threat to popular constitutional values:
[The Founders’] Constitution remained, fundamentally, an act
of popular will: “the people’s” charter, made by the people. . . .
[I]t was “the people themselves”—working through and
responding to their agents in the government—who were
responsible for seeing that it was properly interpreted and
implemented. The idea of turning this responsibility over to
judges was simply unthinkable. . . . This modern
understanding [of judicial review] is . . . of surprisingly recent
vintage.
It reflects neither the original conception of
constitutionalism nor its course over most of American history.
Both in its origins and for most of our history, American
constitutionalism assigned ordinary citizens a central and
pivotal role in implementing their Constitution. . . . [It was the
original understanding that] [n]o one of the branches [of
government] was meant to be superior to any other, unless it
were the legislature, and when it came to constitutional law,
all were meant to be subordinate to the people. . . . [I]n a
regime of popular constitutionalism it was not the judiciary’s
responsibility to enforce the Constitution against the
legislature.
It was “the people’s” responsibility: a
responsibility they discharged mainly through elections. . . . It
was the legislature’s delegated responsibility to decide
whether a proposed law was constitutionally authorized,
76
subject to oversight by the people.
77

Similarly, a 2004 Republican Policy Committee memorandum
specifically embraced court-stripping as the most manageable, and
thus effective, exercise of contemporary popular constitutionalism:

76. H.R REP. No. 108-691 at 25-26 (2004) (quoting KRAMER, supra note 16,
at 7-8, 58-59) (omissions and bracketed material in House Report).
77. In 2004, House Republicans provided 213 of 247 “yes” votes for the
Pledge Protection Act and 206 of 233 “yes” votes for the Marriage Protection
Act. See 150 CONG. REC. H7478 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004); 150 CONG. REC.
H6612 (daily ed. July 22, 2004).
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The American people are not obligated to passively accept
judicial decisions that are contrary to their longstanding
expectations of constitutional freedom.
The Constitution
belongs to the people, not to the judiciary, but the people will
not have any control over their Constitution if they do not
exercise the checks available to them.
The best check available to the people is for their
representatives to eliminate the jurisdiction of the federal
courts over particular issues.
The alternatives are too
cumbersome for all but the most fundamental matters. For
example, it is very difficult to remove judges from office, and
the constitutional amendment process is inadequate to address
all ill-advised judicial pronouncements. And the President has
no power to check the courts beyond the initial appointment
power. That leaves the legislative power to strip the courts of
jurisdiction—a power that is constitutional, proper, and will
enable the people to reassert their authority over the
78
Constitution’s meaning.

B. Jurisdiction-Stripping’s Strengths as an Exercise in Popular
Constitutionalism
The Marriage Protection and Pledge Protection Acts thus
sought to ensure that state court judges—who often are not life79
tenured and instead are subject to some sort of electoral approval —
80
hear these claims.

78. S. REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM., THE CASE FOR JURISDICTION-STRIPPING
LEGISLATION: RESTORING POPULAR CONTROL OF THE CONSTITUTION 4 (2004).
79. Erwin Chemerinsky, Appendix: Historical Background of the Role of the
Legislature in Setting the Power and Jurisdiction of the Courts, in BALANCING
ACT, supra note 1, at 226 (state judges are subject to some form of election in
thirty-eight states); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE
COURT ORGANIZATION 1998, at 19 (1998) (tabulating that approximately eightythree percent of all state judges are subject to some sort of election).
80. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 14, at 8 (“The very idea that unelected,
unaccountable judges could nullify both other branches of Government and the
will of the American people is an offense against our right of self-government
and must not be tolerated.”) (testimony of Phyllis Schlafly); see also Phyllis
Schlafly, We Must Reject the Rule of Judges, THE PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY REP., Mar.
2004 (“We don’t trust the federal courts or the Supreme Court to decide the
cases about the Pledge of Allegiance, the Ten Commandments, and Marriage.
Congress should take away all power from the federal courts to impose the rule
of judges over our rights of self-government. Amending the federal [Defense of
Marriage Act] by the Hostettler bill will not prevent state courts or state
legislatures from legalizing same-sex marriage. However, state legislatures are
usually far more responsive to their constituents than Congress, and many
states are now aggressively moving to protect themselves against judicial
supremacy. . . . State legislatures will also be far more willing and eager to
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Indeed, the 2004 House Judiciary Committee Report on the
Marriage Protection Act emphasized members’ preference for state,
rather than independent federal, arbiters of these matters: “[T]he
Marriage Protection Act would prevent unelected, lifetimeappointed Federal judges from striking down the protection for
states Congress passed in the Defense of Marriage Act[,]” but it
“does not attempt to dictate results: it only places the final authority
over whether states must accept same-sex marriage licenses granted
81
in other states in the hands of the states themselves.”
House
Judiciary Chairman Sensenbrenner similarly described the Pledge
Protection Act’s purpose as protecting the Pledge of Allegiance “from
Federal court decisions that would have the effect of invalidating the
Pledge across several States, or nationwide,” while “preserv[ing] to
State courts the authority to decide whether the Pledge is valid
82
within that State’s boundaries.”
Shifting jurisdiction in this direction helps achieve popular
constitutionalism’s objective of reasserting democratic control over
the Constitution’s meaning, as most state court judges are subject to
some sort of election, thus requiring the public’s approval to get or
83
keep their jobs. Moreover, because state judicial districts tend to
be smaller than their federal counterparts, state court judges may
feel closer ties to the surrounding community, “thereby enjoying a
84
greater aura of democratic accountability.” For these reasons, “[a]
state court’s decision, which binds only the people of that state,
enjoys a greater perception of democratic legitimacy and local
85
responsiveness than that of an unelected Article III ‘outsider.’”

impeach state judges who use judicial supremacy to rewrite state
constitutions.”).
81. H.R. REP. No. 108-614, at 2 (2004).
82. 150 CONG. REC. H7451 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004).
83. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
84. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the
Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1887 (2001).
85. Id. at 1902; see also Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Judicial
Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 96 F.R.D. 245, 258 (1982)
(remarks of Randall Rader) (“[Congress] may also want state courts, which are
closer to some sensitive local issues, to make the first attempt at settling them.
Finally, it may see the wisdom of allowing state courts to first test the
legitimacy of state policies, thus reducing the animosity which may arise from a
federal court reversal of state policy.”). Note, however, that some evidence
suggests that the people may perceive state courts as less trustworthy precisely
because of their political accountability. See DAMON CANN & JEFF YATES,
HOMEGROWN INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY: ASSESSING CITIZENS’ DIFFUSE SUPPORT
FOR THEIR STATE COURTS 16 (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=870592 (“Citizens
in states using partisan elections to select judges have lower levels of diffuse
support than citizens in states that appoint their judges. This supports our
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Moreover, even if never enacted into law, the mere threat of
jurisdictional change may achieve popular constitutionalism’s
objectives.
Some may hope to change courts’ constitutional
interpretations not by switching judicial forums but by influencing
judges to change their behavior in light of challenges to their
86
authority. Then-House Majority Leader Tom Delay, for example,
made this goal clear in explaining his support for the Pledge
Protection Act at a time when challenges to the Pledge remained
pending in the federal courts: “I think that would be a very good
idea to send a message to the judiciary they ought to keep their
87
hands off the Pledge of Allegiance.”
Under this view, simply
proposing jurisdictional change may be a successful popular
constitutionalist exercise.
History suggests the success of such a strategy, as policymakers’
past threats to the courts have triggered changes in judicial
outcomes. Recall, for example, President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
1937 Court-packing plan, intended to change the Court’s
composition after its series of decisions striking down various New
Deal legislation. Although Congress rejected the effort, many credit
that proposal with inspiring “the switch in time that saved nine”—
i.e., the Court’s newfound willingness to uphold the constitutionality
88
of Roosevelt’s programs.
Similarly, although Congress failed to
enact the 1957 Jenner-Butler effort to strip the Court of jurisdiction
89
over certain national security matters, that legislative effort was
followed shortly by a series of decisions in which the Court softened
90
some of its earlier opinions on those issues.

hypothesis that competitive, politicized judicial elections vitiate citizen
perceptions of the legitimacy of state courts.”).
86. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 34, at 1500 (“[I]f the political branches do
indeed enjoy virtually plenary jurisdiction-stripping power, as some have
claimed, savvy federal judges will keep this power in mind whenever they
decide controversial cases.”); Tribe, supra note 33, at 153 (suggesting that courtstripping bills are intended to intimidate judges into changing their minds).
87. Stephen Dinan, DeLay Threatens to Curb Courts’ Jurisdiction: Vents Ire
over Pledge of Allegiance, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at A4.
88. PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at 13-14 (“So once again, as in 1937, the
Supreme Court emerged from a test of strength with its great constitutional
powers unimpaired.
In 1937 [the Court] had achieved this result by
abandoning the line of decisions which had brought it into conflict with the
democratic forces of a new world which the justices had not comprehended.”).
89. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
90. PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at 12-13 (noting that the Supreme Court’s
later decisions might be seen as its “strategic withdrawal from controversial
positions under pressure of Congress and some sectors of public opinion. . . .
Whatever the explanation for the 1959 decisions, the Court’s change in
direction had an immediate effect in reducing congressional enthusiasm for
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Moreover, by advocating jurisdictional changes as a remedy for
specific examples of what they believe to be judicial abuses,
proponents signal not only the sorts of decisions but also the sorts of
nominees they will embrace or oppose. To the extent that legislators
then influence changes in the judiciary’s composition, jurisdictional
91
change becomes less necessary.
Focusing attention on judicial
power may thus be an effective strategy for changing not only the
92
scope of that power but also the personnel who exercise it. Either
way, the goals of popular constitutionalism advance.
Congressional proponents have thus identified a technique that
may not only be effective in achieving popular constitutionalism’s
objectives, but also particularly ingenious in countering its
detractors.
Recall the significant criticism of the theory as
93
insufficiently specific as to its modern-day applications.
In

Court-curbing legislation”).
91. See Ross, supra note 27, at 774 (noting no need to strip the Court of
jurisdiction to hear certain cases if the Court’s composition changes in a way
that changes the outcome of those cases). Then-Chief Justice Rehnquist was
among those suggesting that changing courts’ composition through the
appointments process—rather than attacking courts’ jurisdiction or seeking
impeachment—is the constitutionally appropriate response to unpopular
decisions. CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM REHNQUIST, 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/year-end/2004year-endreport.pdf (“The Constitution protects judicial
independence not to benefit judges, but to promote the rule of law: judges are
expected to administer the law fairly, without regard to public reaction. . . .
[P]ublic reaction to judicial decisions, if it is sustained and widespread, can be a
factor in the electoral process and lead to the appointment of judges who might
decide cases differently.”); id. at 7-8 (asserting that the only way to “be certain
that the Judicial Branch is subject to the popular will” is “by the gradual
process of changing the federal Judiciary through the appointment process. . . .
[O]ur Constitution has struck a balance between judicial independence and
accountability, giving individual judges secure tenure but making the federal
Judiciary subject ultimately to the popular will because judges are appointed
and confirmed by elected officials”).
92. Congress may also propose court-stripping to placate constituents who
demand some action in response to an unpopular decision. As William Ross
observed:
[Legislators] may advocate curtailment of judicial review primarily as
a means of curryng favor with constituents who are piqued by the
Court’s decisions. Such legislators may have no personal animosity
toward the Court and may well recognize that their Court-curbing
efforts are futile. Throughout history, even the most adamant
congressional proponents of curbing judicial review have contented
themselves with dropping a bill into the hopper and making an
occasional speech about the Court’s iniquities.
Ross, supra note 27, at 786.
93. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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response, congressional advocates propose to add real prescriptive
content to what has been largely a descriptive account of popular
constitutionalism’s past practice.
Those skeptical of popular constitutionalism also question its
ability definitively to resolve important constitutional disputes,
emphasizing the salutary role played by both state and federal
94
courts in ensuring finality and settlement. The House’s approach
answers these objections too, at least in part, because it retains a
role for the courts in achieving those functions. Rather than
eliminating judicial review altogether, Congress instead proposes
simply to redistribute power to the judiciary that appears more
likely to replicate congressional—and thus, perhaps, “the people’s”—
95
preferences.
These initiatives thus offer an attractive option for
those who maintain that “both judicial supremacy and popular
constitutionalism each contribute indispensable benefits to the
American constitutional polity,” urging us to “strike a viable balance
between the rule of law and “the people’s” authority to speak to
96
issues of constitutional meaning.”
Not only are these efforts increasingly successful, they are likely
to reemerge in future proposals to shape subject matter jurisdiction
and thus the balance of judicial power. The House’s passage of two
separate court-stripping bills in the same Congress represents a
high-water mark in the court-shaping movement, as does its
passage of the Pledge Protection Act in successive Congresses.
Indeed, some of the dynamics that helped thwart earlier courtstripping measures appear to have diminished or disappeared
97
altogether. In the past, for example, the courts—and especially the
Supreme Court—may have survived congressional attack due to
98
their comparatively strong public reputation. Shifting perceptions
of government institutions may weaken that shield, as one survey
found that a majority of respondents agreed “that ‘judicial activism’
94. Post & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1033-34.
95. But see Chemerinsky, supra note 48, at 681.
96. Post & Siegel, supra note 50, at 1029. Others in fact believe that we
have already struck this balance.
Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular
Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596 (2003); see also Alexander & Solum,
supra note 65, at 1601-02 (suggesting that the American people have already
expressed their constitutional preferences by acquiescing to judicial review as a
key component of our constitutional culture).
97. See PRITCHETT, supra note 1, at 119-20 (attributing the failure of the
Jenner-Butler court-stripping effort to the extreme rhetoric and segregationist
character of its supporters as well as to respect for the Supreme Court as an
institution).
98. See Ross, supra note 27, at 757-58, 766-67 (identifying the Court’s
public popularity, especially compared to other governmental institutions, as a
factor impeding earlier court-stripping efforts).
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has reached the crisis stage, and that judges who ignore voters’
values should be impeached.
Nearly half agreed with a
congressman who said judges are ‘arrogant, out-of-control and
99
unaccountable.’” Other recent polls also suggest a drop in public
support for the courts, including the Supreme Court, at least in
100
some quarters.
Changes in public opinion, accompanied by
proponents’ sheer political power, may encourage further
jurisdictional realignment.
C. The Weaknesses of this Technique as an Exercise in Popular
Constitutionalism
But this approach has its weaknesses as well. First, challenges
remain in figuring out exactly when the federal courts have
thwarted “the people’s” constitutional preferences, thus justifying
congressional intervention. Of the various congressional advocates
of poplar constitutionalism, the Republican Policy Committee came
closest to articulating a standard for this assessment when it
proposed that courts be understood to have undermined “the
people’s” Constitution when their decisions are “dramatically out of
the mainstream of American public opinion”:
Reasonable people will not always agree when a court has
engaged in judicial activism, but it is hard to deny that, in
retrospect, a line of jurisprudence has deviated far from the
Constitution’s text and history. Court rulings such as the
recent Ninth Circuit decision to bar schoolchildren from
voluntarily reciting the full text of the Pledge of Allegiance are
wildly unpopular; indeed, only 6 or 7 percent of Americans
support removing “under God” from the Pledge.
This
unpopularity arises not only because of disagreement with the
policy result, but because the decision represents such a
fundamental change in the way that the Constitution is being
interpreted. . . .
....
Congress should only consider jurisdiction-stripping
legislation when it is apparent that courts are likely to
overreach and craft unpopular laws.
Have courts been
reinterpreting the Constitution in a manner inconsistent with
99. Martha Neil, Half of U.S. Sees ‘Judicial Activism Crisis,’
ABAJOURNAL.COM, Sept. 30, 2005, http://www.abanet.org/journal/redesign/
s30survey. html.
100. Charles Lane, Evangelical Republicans Trust States on Social Issues,
WASH. POST, June 16, 2005, at A3 (describing polls reporting “a significant drop
in public support for the U.S. Supreme Court”).
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its text and history?
Are judges inserting their policy
preferences into their decisions on a given subject, rather than
following settled understandings of the law? Is the resulting
decision dramatically out of the mainstream of American
101
public opinion?

This test’s imprecision exposes some of the difficulties in
converting popular constitutionalism from theory into practice. Do
opinion polls indicating public disagreement with courts’
constitutional interpretation trigger Congress’s obligation to protect
“the people’s” Constitution? If so, how do we know when that
threshold level of unpopularity is satisfied? As a number of
commentators have observed, public opinion may be manipulated by
102
the Court, Congress, or other elites.
Indeed, as David Franklin
observes,
Any attempt to assess the capacity of any person or institution
to speak for ‘the people’ in constitutional matters is plagued
with an evidentiary problem. . . . The evidentiary problem is
that in order to judge how accurately an institution conveys
the constitutional views of “the people” it is necessary first to
measure those views in their ‘raw’ form, and this is quite
103
difficult to do.

A growing number in Congress propose to overcome this
difficulty by acting as the institutional proxy for “the people’s” own
constitutional preferences. But this exposes a second problem, as
one may wonder whether congressional court-stripping is a
principled exercise of popular constitutionalism to be applied
neutrally and consistently—where the people retain the final word
in constitutional interpretation—or instead a grab for legislative
supremacy, whereby the legislature selectively seizes interpretive
authority for itself. Indeed, the Judiciary Committee’s selective
omissions from Kramer’s book are just as interesting as its
104
quotations of it. The ellipses in the Report’s quotations signal
excision of Kramer’s following emphasis that, under popular
constitutionalism, the legislature is not an adequate interpretive
substitute for the judiciary:
In suggesting that the constitutionality of legislation was not a
matter for judicial cognizance, no one was saying that the
authoritative interpreter of the constitution was the
legislature rather than the judiciary. That would have been

101.
102.
103.
104.

S. REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM., supra note 78, at 3-4, 11-12.
See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 96, at 2634-35.
Franklin, supra note 65, at 1076.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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inconsistent with the whole framework of popular
constitutionalism because it would have assumed that final
interpretive authority rested with one or another of these
public agencies. . . . Final interpretive authority rested with
‘the people themselves,’ and courts no less than elected
105
representatives were subordinate to their judgments.

Larry Alexander and Lawrence Solum would similarly define
popular constitutionalism to require that the people interpret and
enforce the Constitution through some form of direct action like
petitions, protest, and/or resistance, rather than through the
President or Congress: “Executive or legislative supremacy is an
alternative to judicial supremacy—of course! But when a strong
President ignores the Constitution or the Court, or a strong
Congress attempts to institute rump parliamentary democracy, it is
106
institutions and not ‘We the People’ who are acting.”
This concern prompts popular constitutionalism’s scholarly
advocates to differ as to whether court-stripping reflects a principled
exercise of the theory, or instead opportunistic efforts by the
legislature to snatch power from the courts. Larry Kramer, for
example, appears to endorse the technique, at least as indicated in
his brief sketch of popular constitutionalism’s contemporary
applications:
The Constitution leaves room for countless political responses
to an overly assertive Court: Justices can be impeached, the
Court’s budget can be slashed, the President can ignore its
mandates, Congress can strip it of jurisdiction or shrink its
size or pack it with new members or give it burdensome new
107
responsibilities or revise its procedures.

105. KRAMER, supra note 16, at 8, 58. At times, however, Kramer seems
open to the possibility that Congress may be at least as good an interpreter as
the judiciary. See id. at 238-39 (suggesting that Congress might do a better job
at constitutional interpretation than many believe).
106. Alexander & Solum, supra note 65, at 1621-22.
107. KRAMER, supra note 16, at 249. Kramer goes on to endorse additional
measures that would require constitutional amendment—like installing limited
and staggered terms for federal judges and easing the difficulty of constitutional
amendment—but notes that the prospect of such changes is unrealistic. Id. at
251. To be sure, Kramer’s examples of judicial excess differ from those offered
by popular constitutionalists in Congress. For example, rather than focusing on
decisions involving gay rights or the Pledge, Kramer characterized the Court’s
decision in Bush v. Gore as an illegitimate exercise of judicial power, suggesting
that a judicial resolution of a presidential election would be impossible in a
world where the people refused to defer to the courts’ characterization of the
Constitution. Id. at 231-32.
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He supports interventions whereby “the authority of judicial
decisions formally and explicitly depends on reactions from the other
108
branches and, through them, from the public,” indicating that
Congress can be trusted to accurately reflect “the people’s”
constitutional preferences because it is politically accountable to the
people for its choices.
Mark Tushnet, in contrast, rejects selective court-stripping
measures as “transparent attempts to achieve particular
substantive goals rather than serious efforts to rethink the role of
109
the courts in society.”
Other critics similarly argue that courtstripping advocates are driven by cynical political self-interest
rather than by a principled commitment to popular
110
constitutionalism. For example, some contemporary conservatives
echoed Senator Barry Goldwater’s criticism of a series of courtstripping bills sponsored by fellow Republicans in the late 1970s and
early 1980s:
What particularly troubles me about trying to override
constitutional decisions of the Supreme Court by a simple bill
is that I see no limit to the practice. There is no clear and
coherent standard to define why we shall control the court in
one area but not another. . . .
....
Whether or not Congress possesses the power of curbing
111
judicial authority, we should not invoke it.

These concerns are exacerbated by the limits of political
accountability, in that voters base their decisions to retain or reject
incumbents on a wide range of considerations that may not include
great attention to legislative changes in jurisdiction. Together,
these dynamics expose the difficulty in parsing Congress’s
preferences from “the people’s”—and thus reveal the risk that
Congress may be seeking to transfer power from the courts not to
108. Id. at 252.
109. TUSHNET, supra note 56, at 175.
110. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. H5408 (daily ed. July 19, 2006) (statement of
Rep. Rohrabacher) (“Here we are neutering our ability to have protections for
the constitutional things we believe in the future, in order to achieve a
temporary, I might even say a political, goal in the Pledge of Allegiance.”).
111. 128 CONG. REC. S2242 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1982); see also Baucus & Kay,
supra note 22, at 992 (“In the case of the Helms school prayer amendment,
there was substantial bi-partisan opposition to the proposal within the House
Judiciary Committee. The opposition appears to have been based on serious
concerns over the [bill’s] constitutionality and wisdom . . . .”).
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112

the people, but to itself.
Finally, conferring state courts with exclusive jurisdiction over
specific constitutional controversies creates the likelihood that “the
people’s” Constitution may mean very different things in different
113
parts of the country.
The Pledge of Allegiance or Defense of
Marriage Act, for example, might well be struck down as
unconstitutional by state supreme courts in New England and on
114
the West Coast, but not in the country’s interior.
This prospect
troubles those who believe that federal courts’ greater ability to
foster uniformity in interpreting federal law should guide decisions
about the appropriate allocation of jurisdiction between state and
115
federal judiciaries.
As Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer
observe:
Just as a rule of precedent recognizes the value of settlement
for settlement’s sake, so too does a constitution exist partly
because of the value of uniform decisions on issues as to which
people have divergent substantive views and personal
agendas. The decision to create a single written constitution,
and thus depart from a model of parliamentary supremacy, is
based on the possibility of varying views about fundamental
112. See, e.g., Gewirtzman, supra note 64, at 922-30 (noting the public’s lack
of trust in Congress, due in part to suspicion about the influence of special
interest groups and campaign contributions).
113. See Tribe, supra note 33, at 154 (noting that if court-stripping
legislation were passed, “[e]ven on the most optimistic of assumptions, state
courts—recognizing themselves to be bound by the Constitution and
constrained to follow the Supreme Court’s authoritative decisions construing
it—would simply replicate the very rulings that had inspired Congress’
jurisdictional restructuring, thereby freezing the law until fact patterns clearly
beyond the Supreme Court’s precedents come along to melt the ice and replace
it with a churning chaos of fifty states moving in fifty different directions in
their understanding and extension of the governing constitutional norms”).
114. A number of commentators contend that state courts may actually be
more hospitable than federal courts in certain areas like gay rights. E.g., Nan
D. Hunter, Federal Courts, State Courts and Civil Rights: Judicial Power and
Politics, 92 GEO. L.J. 941, 948-49 (2004) (“[O]n substantive law grounds, state
systems had begun by the end of the [twentieth] century to rival federal courts
as the preferred arenas for constitutional adjudication, at least in certain
fields.”). Indeed, state, rather than federal, courts have struck down limitations
on same-sex marriage on state constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Baehr v.
Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999). Of
course, these rulings may invite state constitutional amendments to recognize
only opposite-sex marriage, as occurred in Hawaii. See HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.
115. See Ratner, supra note 34, at 166-67 (maintaining that the Constitution
requires that the Supreme Court have authority to review lower and state court
judgments on constitutional matters to ensure the uniformity and supremacy of
the U.S. Constitution and federal law).
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questions, and the nondesirability of leaving their resolution to
116
shifting political fortunes.

Robert Bork shared this concern in congressional testimony
opposing the wave of court-stripping efforts in the 1980s:
[I]f the Supreme Court should undertake to rule upon the
constitutionality or the unconstitutionality of a war, and the
Congress was quite upset, thinking that is not the Supreme
Court’s business as indeed I agree it is not, to use the
exceptions clause to remove Supreme Court jurisdiction would
have the result not of returning power to the Congress but of
turning the question over to each of the State court systems.
We could not tolerate a situation in which fifty states were
deciding through their own judges the constitutionality of a
117
war.

While the Supreme Court’s declining docket increases the
possibility that different federal circuit courts of appeal may split in
their interpretation of constitutional issues, at least the Court
currently retains the discretion and the power to cure such
inconsistencies by granting certiorari. In contrast, Congress’s courtstripping efforts would deprive the Supreme Court—along with the
lower federal courts—of any ability to address variations in
interpretations.
Contemporary court-stripping advocates apparently view state
courts’ differing interpretations of the U.S. Constitution as a small
price to pay for progress in achieving the goals of popular
constitutionalism.
As
Judiciary
Committee
Chairman
Sensenbrenner remarked, “If different States come to different
decisions regarding the constitutionality of the Pledge, the effects of
such decisions will be felt only within those States. A few Federal
judges sitting hundreds of miles away from your State will not be
118
able to rewrite your State’s Pledge policy.”
But some court-stripping proponents acknowledge and attempt
116. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1376 (1997).
117. Selections and Confirmation of Federal Judges: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 7 (1982).
118. 150 CONG. REC. H7451 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 2004). These supporters
suggest that uniformity is not a paramount value when allocating jurisdiction
between state and federal courts, noting that the nation tolerated the prospect
of inconsistent interpretations of federal constitutional law for well over a
century. Indeed, not until 1914 did Congress confer the Supreme Court with
appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions striking down state laws on the
basis of the United States Constitution. Judiciary Act of December 23, 1914, 38
Stat. 790.
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to accommodate these uniformity concerns by suggesting a more
nuanced test. More specifically, the Republican Policy Committee’s
(“RPC”) 2004 memorandum made the case for issue-by-issue
119
evaluation,
arguing that court-stripping is most valuable as a
technique for furthering popular constitutionalist goals when a
constitutional issue “can tolerate lack of uniform interpretation
120
among the states.”
Applying this test, the RPC expressed concern
about the Marriage Protection Act’s effects in leaving the Defense of
Marriage Act’s constitutionality exclusively to state courts to
determine. The RPC noted that, as a practical matter, state courts’
non-uniform approach to marriage would force states that did not
recognize same-sex marriage to develop an approach for dealing
with out-of-state same-sex marriages when those couples relocated
to their state. Moreover, it expressed concern that an inconsistent
definition of marriage would harm “essential national cohesion” and
121
our common culture.
In contrast, the RPC concluded that the
prospect of different approaches to the Pledge of Allegiance
throughout the country did not pose the same practical and cultural
dangers, and thus supported enactment of the Pledge Protection
122
Act.
While congressional advocates of popular constitutionalism thus
demonstrate varying levels of tolerance for regional deviations in
interpreting “the people’s” Constitution, they all seem to accept at
least some degree of inconsistency. They have yet to grapple fully
with the implications of such nonuniformity for a single written
Constitution.
IV. RECENT CONGRESSIONAL INITIATIVES TO SHIFT POWER FROM
STATE TO FEDERAL COURTS
The Schiavo and Class Action Fairness Acts display the flip side
of this coin, demonstrating that congressional perceptions of judicial
abuse are not confined to unelected federal judges. Congress
appears increasingly prepared to strip state as well as federal courts
of certain authority by transferring judicial power to federal judges
when they appear more likely to produce results consistent with the
preferences of a congressional majority.

119. S. REPUBLICAN POL’Y COMM., supra note 78, at 2.
120. Id. at 11, 13-14. As it explained, “just as the Supreme Court exercises
discretion when it decides whether to allow inconsistent constitutional
judgments in state courts and lower federal courts to stand, so too can Congress
exercise the same discretion when deciding whether to limit federal
jurisdiction.” Id. at 10.
121. Id. at 13.
122. Id. at 14.
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The Schiavo Act

In contrast to congressional initiatives to strip the federal
courts of authority over certain controversial federal constitutional
disputes, the Schiavo Act empowered a federal court to hear
renewed federal law challenges to the decision to withdraw lifesustaining measures from Terri Schiavo, who had been in a
123
persistent vegetative state since 1990.
The Act followed years of
litigation in Florida’s state courts between Ms. Schiavo’s husband
(Michael Schiavo) and her parents (the Schindlers); applying state
constitutional and statutory law, the Florida courts ultimately
denied the Schindlers’ claims and ordered Ms. Schiavo’s feeding
124
tube removed.
Unhappy with that result, Congress expressly
conferred the federal district court with jurisdiction to hear the case,
specifically instructing the court to ignore the state courts’ prior
125
determination.
The Act also removed certain procedural barriers
that would have prevented a federal court from deciding the merits
126
of the parents’ claims.
As was the case for the Marriage Protection and Pledge
Protection Acts, a House majority voted to reallocate jurisdiction
between federal and state courts; this time, the measure was
enacted into law. This time, moreover, it was the state courts who—
127
despite their greater political accountability —had frustrated the
will of a congressional majority. As then-House Majority Leader
Tom DeLay fumed: “No little judge sitting in a state district court in
Florida is going to usurp the authority of Congress. This judge, and
the Supreme Court of Florida, are well known to be liberal judges
that have a different world view, and they’re imposing their world
128
view on the law.”
123. Allen, supra note 8, at 311.
124. See id. at 311-12 (“[E]very [Florida] court to consider the issue ruled
that Terri Schiavo was in a persistent vegetative state and that she would not
have wished to continue receiving artificial nutrition and hydration . . . .”).
125. See supra note 7.
126. See Allen, supra note 8, at 319-21 (noting that the Act not only
conferred the federal court with jurisdiction to hear the parents’ federal claims,
but also granted them standing and eliminated abstention, exhaustion, and
claim and issue preclusion doctrine as barriers to addressing the parents’
claims on the merits); see also Schiavo v. Greer, No. 8:05-CV-522-T-30TGW,
2005 WL 754121, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2005) (holding, in a decision prior to
the Schiavo Act, that federal courts have no jurisdiction over the Schindlers’
claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal district courts
from reviewing claims already adjudicated in state court).
127. Unlike federal judges, Florida state court judges are subject to
retention elections. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE
COURT ORGANIZATION 1998, at 21 (1998).
128. See Susan Brinkmann, Schiavo Clings to Life While Battle Continues,
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In charging the Florida state court judges with “usurp[ing] the
authority of Congress,” Representative DeLay and his colleagues
might be understood to mean that the state court judges’
constitutional interpretation strayed from the preferences of a
congressional majority serving as a proxy for “the people” and their
129
constitutional values.
Senator Talent, for example, appeared to
rely on popular constitutionalism in explaining his support for the
Act: “Our actions are consistent with the will of the people of Florida
130
who have been repeatedly frustrated by the State courts.”
Despite Senator Talent’s assessment, however, the Schiavo Act
demonstrably did not reflect popular will, as a series of national
polls indicated that the vast majority of Americans disapproved of
131
Congress’s intervention.
The Act appears to fail even the notably
imprecise test offered by the Republican Policy Committee
memorandum, which argued that jurisdictional change is
appropriate when courts’ decisions are “dramatically out of the
132
mainstream of American public opinion.”
Congress’s
determination to proceed with the Schiavo Act, despite its
unpopularity, resurrects earlier questions about whether and when
Congress can be trusted accurately to reflect “the people’s”
133
constitutional preferences.
But perhaps the Schiavo Act was motivated not by popular
constitutionalism but instead by the belief that federal courts’
constitutional expertise and political insulation leave them better
equipped to protect the rights of vulnerable individuals, even—or
especially—when politically unpopular. Indeed, many supporters of
the Schiavo Act who had earlier backed the Pledge and Marriage
Protection Acts now echoed more traditional defenses of the federal
134
courts’ role and the value of judicial independence.
For example,
THE CATHOLIC STANDARD & TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005.
129. See Jeffrey Rosen, But These Days the Bench is the Hot Seat, WASH.
POST, Mar. 27, 2005, at B1 (characterizing Congress as unhappy with the work
of Florida’s state judges, and simply demanding a new judge by demanding a
new court).
130. 151 CONG. REC. S3104 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005) (statement of Sen. Jim
Talent).
131. PollingReport.com, Terri Schiavo, http://pollingreport.com/news.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2006). For example, Pew Research Center and Gallup
polls found that approximately three-fourths of Americans polled in 2005 felt
that Congress should have stayed out of the matter.
132. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
134. This switch did not escape the Schiavo Act’s critics. See, e.g., 151 CONG.
REC. H1600 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2005) (statement of Rep. Nadler) (“[W]e do not
trust State courts any more. We do not trust the elected State courts, we want
the unelected Federal judges that we normally excoriate in this Chamber. Now
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House Judiciary Chairman James Sensenbrenner argued:
[W]hile our federalist structure reserves broad authority to the
States, America’s Federal courts have played a historic role in
defending the constitutional rights of all Americans, including
the disadvantaged, disabled, and dispossessed. Among the
God-given rights protected by the Constitution, no right is
more sacred than the right to life. The legislation we will
consider today will ensure that Terri Schiavo’s constitutional
right to life will be given the Federal court review that her
135
situation demands.

Of course, such appeals to federal courts’ institutional
advantages are most often invoked by defenders of judicial review.
Notably, those capabilities received no mention in the arguments
made by Representative Sensenbrenner and others when seeking to
strip federal courts of their authority to hear specific constitutional
claims likely to be brought by religious minorities, gay men, and
136
lesbians.
And although Representative Sensenbrenner and other
advocates had earlier emphasized state courts’ greater political
accountability as enhancing their fealty to “the people’s”
constitutional values regarding the Pledge of Allegiance and same137
sex marriage, nowhere did he or other Schiavo Act supporters
explain why the Florida state courts could not similarly be entrusted
with “the people’s” constitutional preference on end-of-life issues. In
short, congressional advocates have yet to explain why popular
constitutionalism is the appropriate guide for allocating jurisdiction
between state and federal courts in some constitutional matters and
not others, fueling fears that the theory is opportunistically invoked.
Despite Congress’s best efforts, the federal courts also denied
138
the Schindlers’ claims.
Some in Congress responded with fury,
suddenly they are trustworthy and we want to come and say they should start a
whole new proceeding after everything is over and drag the case on, to the
anguish of the family members, for another few years.”); id. (statement of Rep.
Blumenauer) (“I note that this is the same majority party that would seek to
deny the Supreme Court the authority to be able to deal with matters that
relate to marriage. They think that that is not appropriate for the Federal
court. They do not trust the Supreme Court to deal with these personal issues.
But if they are thinking that they can continue with efforts to have government
interfere with some of the most painful, personal areas, then they are willing to
cast aside consistency and move forward.”).
135. 151 CONG. REC. H1701 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005).
136. See 151 CONG. REC. H1600 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 2005) (statements of
Reps. Nadler and Blumenauer).
137. See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
138. Schiavo ex rel Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1229 (11th Cir.
2005).
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threatening still more jurisdictional change as a challenge to the
judicial review that had stymied congressional preferences. In the
words of Representative Steve King: “That kind of judge needs to be
worried about what kind of role Congress will play in his future. . . .
We have the constitutional authority to eliminate any and all
139
inferior [federal] courts.”
Coming from one of the House’s leading
140
advocates of popular constitutionalism, this reaction exacerbates
concerns that Congress’s interest in jurisdictional change is
motivated more by a desire to assert its own authority than to
protect “the people’s” constitutional values.
B.

The Class Action Fairness Act

Like the Schiavo Act, CAFA’s enactment reveals that even
politically accountable state judges face jurisdictional change when
they deliver results unpopular with Congress on state law
141
questions.
CAFA illustrates the use of this jurisdiction-switching
technique in a non-constitutional context, demonstrating its
potential ubiquity. And while, of course, Congress may have a
variety of motivations for its actions, Congress’s willingness to alter
state and federal courts’ respective spheres of influence on matters
unrelated to constitutional interpretation suggests that something
other than popular constitutionalism may also explain Congress’s
growing interest in jurisdictional realignment.
While CAFA’s objectives included curbing certain class action
abuses such as settlements that generated large fees for attorneys
142
but little benefit to class members, by the time of its enactment
“the main thrust of CAFA was no longer practice abuses but alleged
forum shopping. In recent years, federal courts had been perceived
by both plaintiffs’ and defendants’ lawyers as less sympathetic to
143
class actions and to plaintiffs’ cases than certain state courts.”
In
enacting CAFA, Congress voted to empower federal judges to decide
many class actions alleging violations of state, rather than federal,
144
law.
Affected cases include those involving “high-profile, highstakes class actions grounded in state law theories of product
139. Charles Babington, GOP is Fracturing over Power of Judiciary, WASH.
POST, Apr. 7, 2005, at A4 (“DeLay and his allies, however, remain infuriated
that the Atlanta-based Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit refused Congress’s
orders to take control of Schiavo’s case from Florida courts.”).
140. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 8, at 356 (concluding that in both the
Schiavo and Class Action Fairness Acts, Congress made jurisdictional changes
in hopes of altering substantive litigation outcomes).
142. Id. at 1594-95.
143. Id.
144. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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health, safety, environmental
liability, consumer fraud,”
146
protection, and civil rights. CAFA requires only minimal diversity
147
to trigger federal jurisdiction in covered cases, rather than the
148
complete diversity that had previously been required.
Moreover,
CAFA dismantled a series of barriers to the removal of such claims
149
to federal court when initially filed in state court.
CAFA thus
provides defendants in most multistate class actions with a federal
150
forum.
Whether CAFA’s effects are salutary or malign is the subject of
vigorous debate. Stephen Yeazell, for example, sees CAFA “as a
small step toward the more intelligent deployment of diversity
151
jurisdiction.”
He maintains that the cases covered by CAFA
“should be federalized because they are simply bigger than any
single state, and one wants to be sure that the interests of all the
relevant states, and perhaps of the national government, are being
152
taken into account.”
On the other hand, critics point out that CAFA has shifted
bargaining power to defendants by denying plaintiffs access to the
forum of their choice. Most corporate defendants prefer a federal
153
forum, in large part because they win more often there.
As
Professors Clermont and Eisenberg report, “[r]emoval of civil cases
from state to federal courts results in a precipitous drop in the
154
plaintiffs’ win rate.”
Plaintiffs, of course, often prefer state court
in these cases for the same reason. Plaintiffs (often workers and
consumers) can thus expect the defendants (often corporations)
promptly to remove a diversity case to federal court, a trend greatly

145. Adam N. Steinman, Sausage-Making, Pigs’ Ears, and Congressional
Expansions of Federal Jurisdiction: Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah and Its Lessons
for the Class Action Fairness Act, 81 WASH. L. REV. 279, 287-98 (2006).
146. John Conyers, Jr., Class Action “Fairness”—A Bad Deal for the States
and Consumers, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 493, 507 (2003).
147. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Sherman, supra note 13, at 1606, 1615 (“CAFA is primarily a
jurisdictional act, accomplishing the transfer to federal courts of most
multistate class actions.”).
151. Stephen C. Yeazell, Overhearing Part of a Conversation: Shutts As a
Moment in a Long Dialogue, 74 UMKC L. REV. 779, 780 (2006).
152. Id. at 794.
153. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really
Reveal Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593-94 (1998).
154. Id. (“[A] shift to an unfavorable forum depresses the plaintiffs’ win
rate”).
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facilitated by CAFA’s expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction.
Either way, CAFA clearly reflects Congress’s assessment that
federal rather than state courts are better entrusted with these
claims. As Georgene Vairo observes, “The crux of the legislation,
however, is that state courts cannot be trusted to resolve fairly cases
brought under state law. . . . [I]t would be difficult to envision a
156
more explicit statement that the state courts cannot be trusted.”
The statute’s purposes section makes this clear: “State and local
courts are—(A) keeping cases of national importance out of Federal
court; (B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against
out-of-State defendants; and (C) making judgments that impose
their view of the law on other States and bind the rights of the
157
residents of those States.”
To be sure, CAFA’s focus on state statutory and common law
claims involves no reliance on popular constitutionalism as an
underlying rationale. But that CAFA’s champions assessed the
relative merits of state and federal courts in terms never mentioned
during debates on the Marriage Protection, Pledge Protection, and
Schiavo Acts remains interesting, inviting questions. For example,
while proponents of the Pledge Protection and Marriage Protection
Acts remained untroubled by the inconsistent interpretations of the
U.S. Constitution that would result from entrusting exclusive
jurisdiction of those claims to fifty state judiciaries, CAFA’s
congressional advocates stressed federal courts’ ability to deliver
more uniform outcomes than their state counterparts: “Article III of
the Constitution ensures that there will be a fair, uniform, and
efficient forum (a federal court) for adjudicating interstate
158
commercial disputes, so as to nurture interstate commerce.”
155. Other commentators have also noted that federal courts’ diversity
power offers a more hospitable forum to corporate defendants than their state
court alternatives. See, e.g., JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: Complex
Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV.
717, 717 (2004) (“[T]he federal courts offer an ever-more-enticing package of
rules that can conflict with state practice and produce profoundly different
outcomes in cases.
Were these results neutral, they would not be so
troublesome; however, procedural differences in the federal courts typically
disadvantage plaintiffs, not defendants, and so provide an increasing incentive
for defendant forum shopping.”); 1 FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., WORKING PAPERS
AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 449-51 (1990) (“[T]he claimants able to obtain
diversity consist disproportionately of the powerful and influential . . . .
[T]wentieth century scholarship suggests that bias may have been less
important in the creation of diversity jurisdiction than the desire to protect
commercial interests from pro-debtor state courts.”).
156. VAIRO, supra note 42, at 12-13.
157. Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4), 119 Stat. 1, 4-5 (2005).
158. S. REP. 109-14 (2005); see also The Class Action Fairness Act of 1999:
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And while Pledge Protection and Marriage Protection Act
supporters found that state courts’ political accountability left them
better suited to protect “the people’s” constitutional values, Congress
found that same accountability a liability in deciding multistate
class ations. More specifically, CAFA supporters suggested that
state courts’ lack of political insulation left them all too willing to
punish out-of-state class action defendants who could never hold
those judges electorally accountable:
Let me refer to this chart, called ‘‘Magic Jurisdictions.’’
This is Dickie Scruggs, one of the best plaintiffs’ lawyers in the
country, a man I have great respect for. But in a luncheon
talk on the asbestos situation at a panel discussion at the
Prudential Securities Financial Research and Regulatory
Conference on May 9, 2002, he had this to say. This is Dickie
Scruggs. You can believe him. This man understands the
litigation field. He is a billionaire from practicing law. He
said:
What I call the ‘‘Magic Jurisdictions” is where the
judiciary is elected with verdict money. The trial lawyers
have established relationships with the judges that are
elected. They are State court judges. They are populists.
They have large populations of voters who are in on the
deal. They are getting their piece, in many cases. And so
it’s a political force in their jurisdiction and it’s almost
impossible to get a fair trial if you are a defendant in some
of these places. The plaintiff lawyer walks in there and
writes the number on the blackboard, and the first juror
meets the last one coming out the door with that amount
of money. The cases are not won in the courtroom.
They’re won on the back roads long before the case goes to
trial. Any lawyer fresh out of law school can walk in there
and win the case, so it doesn’t matter what the evidence or
the law is.
That is one of the leading plaintiffs’ lawyers in the

Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on Administrative
Oversight and the Courts, 106th Cong. 44 (1999) (remarks of Sen. Jeff Sessions)
(“Just as a matter of public policy, wouldn’t it be better that that [class action]
case be settled and handled in a Federal court, where the U.S. Supreme Court
may ultimately decide an issue, as opposed to the plaintiffs being able to search
50 states and then finding the most favorable law and then find the county or
circuit within that State that would be most favorable to their lawsuit and filing
it there?”).
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country. He was honest enough to call it the way it is in
159
Madison County.

CAFA’s proponents further explained the value of federal
courts’ independence when opposing an amendment that would
exclude class actions brought under state civil rights laws from
CAFA:
[C]ivil rights litigants have nothing to fear from federal judges.
Federal judges, under Article III of the Constitution, are
appointed for life. One reason the Framers designed the
federal judiciary that way was to protect federal judges from
political pressure and ensure that they would provide equal
treatment to minority groups with less political power. It is
thus no accident that federal courts have issued decisions like
Brown v. Board of Education that, although unpopular at the
time, paved the way for future civil rights laws like Title VII
160
and Section 1983.

Congressional advocates of jurisdictional change thus have yet
to explain why certain characteristics, such as federal courts’
judicial independence and greater ability to deliver uniform
interpretations, are only intermittently valuable when debating the
division of power between state and federal courts. Their failure to
do so invites the charge that proponents may be more interested in
changing the identity of winners and losers in certain cases, rather
than engaging in a thoughtful re-evaluation of the courts’
appropriate spheres of influence. These concerns only deepen if, as
some predict, the enactment of CAFA and the Schiavo Act inspire
future attempts to shift jurisdiction when a congressional majority
161
is dissatisfied with state court results.
159. 151 CONG. REC. S1095 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
160. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 56 (2005).
161. Some predict that this may be particularly likely in physician-assisted
suicide, stem cell research, and other cases that raise particularly thorny
constitutional issues. See John A. Robertson, Schiavo and Its (In)Significance,
35 STETSON L. REV. 101, 120-21 (2005). As one observer wondered: “[S]uppose a
custody battle between divorced parents explodes on the national scene because
one parent has become involved in a homosexual relationship. Could Congress
legislate in a way that takes this traditional state matter out of state courts
with the result of awarding custody to the heterosexual parent?” Marcia Coyle,
Life After Schiavo, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 28, 2005, at 10. Indeed, Congress tried to
wield its jurisdiction-shaping authority on at least one prior occasion, when it
responded to another high-profile family dispute by stripping District of
Columbia courts of the power to impose sanctions against Elizabeth Morgan for
violating child visitation orders and prohibiting her ex-husband, Eric Foretich,
from enforcing his visitation rights. See Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d
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CONCLUSION

Inconsistent congressional assessments of judicial review are
not new. Senator Butler’s behavior in the mid-twentieth century
162
offers a prime example.
In 1954, claiming dismay over the
Roosevelt Administration’s court-packing plan and similar attacks
on judicial independence, he proposed a constitutional amendment
to Article III’s Exceptions Clause that would protect the Supreme
163
Court’s jurisdiction from congressional interference. He warned:
The smoke has cleared long ago from the field of the 1937
battle, but there always is the danger of a renewal, sooner or
later, of the campaign against judicial independence. The
relatively slim margin by which that most recent major
assault was repelled, thanks to the vigilance of the Judiciary
Committee of this body, should serve as a warning that the
defenses require reinforcement.
....
Upon several occasions, during attacks upon the Court’s
independence, there have been threats to strip it of the right to
review cases raising constitutional issues. Such threats found
164
expression as recently as the 1937 controversy.

Just three years later, however, outraged by the Court’s
decisions striking down various government efforts to regulate
“subversive activities,” Senator Butler invoked the Exceptions
Clause power he had so recently sought to eliminate and led the
165
nearly successful movement to slash federal jurisdiction.
With its most recent efforts to shape jurisdiction, Congress
challenges judicial review once again—and once again sends mixed
1198, 1203-04 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (striking down the court-stripping legislation as
violating constitutional protections against bills of attainder). There too
Congress did not trust local judges to rule in a manner consistent with the will
of a congressional majority, and responded by enacting jurisdictional change.
Michael Allen also predicts that Congress may be emboldened to influence other
substantive litigation outcomes through jurisdictional change—for example,
ensuring that more medical malpractice claims brought under state tort law are
heard in federal court by eliminating the amount-in-controversy requirement
and/or requiring only minimal diversity. Allen, supra note 8, at 356 & n.237.
162. See Ross, supra note 27, at 784 (“Most Court-curbing movements have
been motivated by individual decisions or series of decisions rather than by any
principled or consistent objections to judicial review.”).
163. S.J. Res. 44, 83d Cong. (1954).
164. 99 CONG. REC. 1106-07 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1954) (statement of Sen.
Butler).
165. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
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signals. Exploring Congress’s growing interest in cutting back
federal courts’ jurisdiction in some areas while expanding it in
others illuminates congressional assessments of the appropriate
allocation of authority not only between state and federal courts, but
also between the legislative and judicial branches. Taken together,
these proposals reflect an increasingly dominant view of the
appropriate separation of powers that permits Congress to
redistribute jurisdiction to curb a federal or state judiciary that has
produced results inconsistent with the preferences of a congressional
majority.
These efforts also highlight Congress’s mounting willingness to
invoke popular constitutionalism as a justification for reshaping the
balance of power between state and federal courts. Considerably
less clear is whether this exercise reveals a principled commitment
to institutional change, or instead the assertion of sheer political
power to change litigation’s winners and losers. Congress’s selective
embrace of popular constitutionalism—the notion that “the people,”
rather than the courts, are the Constitution’s legitimate
interpreters—underscores the theory’s shortcomings. These include
the difficulty of ascertaining with confidence “the people’s”
constitutional preferences; the danger that Congress may be seeking
to transfer power from the courts not to the people, but to itself; and
the potential that state courts will interpret “the people’s”
Constitution to mean very different things in different parts of the
country. Indeed, intermittent congressional appeals to popular
constitutionalism that appear opportunistic invite skepticism that
we can and should trust Congress to speak for “we the People” on
matters of constitutional interpretation, thus bolstering the case for
judicial review.

